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Summary: This article shows that there is a lack of consistency in the 
interpretation of the meaning and scope of the obligation of traders 
to provide transparent pre-contractual and contractual information on 
consumer credit to consumers in EU law. On the basis of an analysis 
of transparency requirements prescribed by the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive and the Consumer Credit Directive, differences in the under-
standing of transparency are highlighted. While the transparency test 
under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive focuses on the question of 
comprehensibility of credit information, the transparency test under 
the Consumer Credit Directive focuses on the format, position, length 
and font size of information. Consequently, the transparency of the 
same information provided in the course of concluding a consumer 
credit agreement could be evaluated differently on the basis of these 
two directives.
This lack of consistency in the interpretation of transparency might 
pose a particular problem for national enforcement authorities. In the 
example of Croatia, it is demonstrated that the lack of guidance and 
consistency in the interpretation of various transparency requirements 
in the area of consumer credit at the EU level leaves space for national 
enforcement authorities to develop their own understanding of trans-
parency. Where national enforcement authorities develop a narrower 
approach to transparency, consumers can be deprived of the protec-
tion guaranteed by EU law. In areas such as consumer credit, where 
the obligation of the transparent provision of information is the main 
tool of consumer protection and market integration, ensuring greater 
consistency in the interpretation of the content of this obligation is the 
key to ensuring its effectiveness. 
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the creation of consumer law and policy at 
the level of the European Union (EU), the obligation of traders to provide 
information to consumers has been one the most prominent tools of con-
sumer protection at the EU level.1 This is because EU consumer law is 
built on the ideas that a) consumers are, due to information asymmetry, 
weaker parties vis-à-vis businesses, and b) their behaviour on the mar-
ket can be affected by information.2 Regardless of the fact that reliance 
on disclosure as the main instrument of consumer protection, especially 
in complex sectors like fi nance, has been heavily criticised,3 the Europe-
an legislator is not yet willing to let go of this tool. On the contrary, over 
the years, information lists contained in various instruments of consum-
er law have only become longer and more detailed.4  
At the same time, the European legislator became aware that not 
all information benefi ts consumers. Information that is incorrect, incon-
sistent, overly technical or lengthy will not enable consumers to make a 
1 The right to information and education was recognised as one of the fi ve basic rights of 
consumers as early as in 1975, when the fi rst consumer policy document was adopted at 
the EU level (point 3 of the Preliminary programme of the European Economic Commu-
nity for a consumer protection and information policy [1975] OJ C92/2). The currently 
applicable Consumer Agenda, which was adopted in 2012, sees information as one of the 
main tools of consumer empowerment, and emphasises the need of consumers for quality 
information on goods and services (points 3.3. and 4.2. of COM (2012) 225: Communica-
tion from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: ‘A European Consumer Agenda - Boosting 
confi dence and growth’). See also Martien Schaub, ‘How to Make the Best of Mandatory 
Information Requirements in Consumer Law’ (2017) 25(1) European Review of Private Law 
25, 26−27; Marco BM Loos, ‘Double Dutch: On the Role of the Transparency Requirement 
with Regard to the Language in Which Standard Contract Terms for B2C-contracts Must Be 
Drafted’ (2017) 6(2) Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 54, 54−55.
2 Vanessa Mak, ‘The Myth of the “Empowered Consumer”: Lessons from Financial Literacy 
Studies’ (2012) 1(4) Zeitschrift Für Europäisches Unternehmens- Und Verbraucherrecht 
254, 256−258; Michael Faure and Hanneke Luth, ‘Behavioural Economics in Unfair Con-
tract Terms’ (2011) 34(3) Journal of Consumer Policy 337, 350−351; Thomas Wilhelmsson 
and Christian Twigg-Flesner, ‘Pre-contractual Information Duties in the acquis communau-
taire’ (2006) 2(4) European Review of Contract Law 441, 449−452; Geraint Howells, ‘The 
Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information’ (2005) 32(3) Journal of 
Law and Society 349, 349−351.
3 Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘EC Consumer Law: Has It Come of Age?’ 
(2003) 28(3) EL Rev 370, 380−382; Howells (n 2) 356−362; Thomas Wilhelmsson, ‘Cooper-
ation and Competition Regarding Standard Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (2006) 
17(1) European Business Law Review 49, 50−54; Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, 
‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159(3) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
647, 665−667; Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘Regulatory Techniques in Consum-
er Protection: A Critique of European Consumer Contract Law’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 109, 
116−119; Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E Schneider, ‘The Futility of Cost-Benefi t Analysis in 
Financial Disclosure Regulation’ (2014) 43(S2) The Journal of Legal Studies 253, 258−262.
4 Schaub (n 1) 26−27. 
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rational transactional decision. On the contrary, it might prevent them 
from choosing the offer most suitable to their needs.5 For these reasons, 
traders are now required to provide consumers with transparent infor-
mation on the goods or services they offer. As in other areas of law,6 trans-
parency has become the imperative in European consumer law. Traders 
are obliged to provide consumers with ‘clear and comprehensible’,7 ‘clear, 
comprehensible and prominent’,8 or ‘clear, concise and prominent’9 in-
formation. While it is impossible to overlook the ever-growing presence 
and variety of transparency requirements in European consumer law,10 
it is hardly possible to establish their meaning with certainty. This is 
because the legal instruments prescribing transparency requirements 
for consumer information usually do not defi ne their meaning and scope 
and, thus far, European institutions have not provided an overarching 
interpretation of transparency. 
In the absence of an EU-wide understanding of what the obliga-
tion to provide transparent consumer information entails, national en-
forcement authorities have space to develop different understandings of 
transparency, which could deprive this regulatory tool of any effective-
ness. In European consumer law, transparency is envisaged as a twofold 
tool; it aims to strengthen the Internal Market and ensure a high level 
of consumer protection.11 Through the harmonisation of rules on the 
transparent provision of information, the European legislator seeks to 
5 According to George Akerlof’s Lemon Market Theory, the presence of information asym-
metry between sellers and buyers can have an adverse impact on the quality of goods and 
services offered on the market. Namely, due to information asymmetry, buyers cannot as-
sess the quality of goods and services offered by the sellers, which incentivises the sellers to 
present their goods and services as being of higher value than they actually are. However, 
because buyers are aware of this, when deciding whether to purchase, they will take the 
average quality of the goods and services on the market into consideration. As a result, 
high-quality goods and services will be driven out of the market since they will only sell for 
average quality goods and services. See George A Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
6 For a conceptual analysis of transparency and its role in different areas of law, see Ida 
Koivisto ‘The Anatomy of Transparency: The Concept and Its Multifarious Implications’ 
2016/09 EUI Working Paper MWP, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/41166 
(accessed 29 October 2018). 
7 Art 6(1) Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oc-
tober 2011 on consumer rights [2011] OJ L304/64 (CRD).
8 Art 5(3) of Directive (EU) 2015/2302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2015 on package travel and linked travel arrangements [2015] OJ L326/1 (PTD).
9 Art 11(2) of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable 
property [2014] OJ L60/34 (MCD).
10 For an overview of various transparency requirements in European consumer law and 
different aspects of transparency, see Loos (n 1) 55.
11 Schaub (n 1) 28−29.
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facilitate greater comparability of goods and services at the EU level and 
ensure that consumers receive information they can act upon.12 Howev-
er, if these objectives are dependent on whether consumers receive an 
understandable set of information describing a particular good or ser-
vice, it is necessary for enforcement authorities across the EU to assess 
information transparency in a similar manner. 
This paper aims to show that, in order to be able to rely on infor-
mation transparency as a tool, there is a need for (greater) consistency 
in the interpretation of transparency requirements. I will demonstrate 
the existence of such a need on the basis of a case study on the mean-
ing and scope of transparency requirements in the area of consumer 
credit. This area is chosen due to its relevance. Namely, a vast number 
of cases on transparency of consumer information concern credit agree-
ments.13 I will fi rst show that there is a lack of consistent interpretation 
of what transparency of consumer credit information under EU law en-
tails (part 2). In this regard, I will discuss the differences between the 
interpretation of transparency under the Unfair Contract Terms Direc-
tive (UCTD)14 and the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD),15 whilst both of 
these instruments offer essential protection to consumers concluding 
credit contracts. I will then analyse how this lack of consistency as to the 
meaning and scope of transparency impacts the way national enforce-
ment authorities understand transparency, leading to different outcomes 
in practice and affecting the position of consumers (part 3). To do so, I 
will analyse how Croatian courts have assessed the transparency of con-
sumer credit agreements. Croatia has been chosen as an example due to 
the increased litigation in this area in the past few years.16     
2. The European dimension − the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
and the Consumer Credit Directive
Until now, the transparency of information on credit agreements 
given to consumers by credit providers was mostly assessed on the basis 
of the UCTD. Cases relevant for the interpretation of the meaning and 
scope of the UCTD’s transparency requirements include both mortgage 
12 ibid.
13 Hans-W Micklitz and Norbert Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive (UCTD)’ (2014) 51(3) CML Rev 771, 771−772.
14 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts 
[1993] OJ L95/29 (UCTD).
15 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 
on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC [2008] 
OJ L133/66 (CCD).
16 Tatjana JosipoviÊ and Hano Ernst, ‘Recent Crisis-motivated Reforms in Croatian Private 
Law’ (2015) 13(1) Evropski Pravnik 73, 82−83.
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and consumer credit agreements. This is not surprising considering that 
very specifi c and detailed rules on information and transparency re-
quirements for consumer credit and mortgage agreements were adopted 
only recently.17 
The UCTD is a minimum harmonisation directive that obliges trad-
ers to offer fair and transparent standard18 contract terms to consumers. 
It does so by envisaging that unfair contract terms, ie terms that, con-
trary to good faith, cause a signifi cant imbalance between the parties’ 
contractual rights and obligations, to the detriment of the consumer,19 
cannot be binding on consumers.20 Also, it requires all written contract 
terms (including terms of consumer credit contracts) to be drafted in 
plain, intelligible language and ambiguous terms to be interpreted in a 
manner most favourable to the consumer.21 Under the UCTD, even terms 
regulating the contract’s subject matter and price (core contract terms), 
which are usually exempt from unfairness assessment, are subject to 
transparency control.22 Core contract terms escape unfairness control 
due to the idea that their regulation should be subject to the will of the 
parties and market forces instead of judicial control.23 However, if core 
contract terms are not plain and intelligible, it is highly unlikely that 
they can genuinely be subject to the free will of the contracting parties 
or market competition. In this sense, as Micklitz observes, transparency 
control is the minimum standard the UCTD provides for.24  
Like other EU directives demanding transparency, the UCTD does 
not defi ne the meaning and scope of the obligation to draft contract 
terms in plain, intelligible language. Still, thus far, the CJEU has pro-
vided the most extensive interpretation of transparency in its case law 
17 In 2008, the information model for consumer credit agreements was fully harmonised 
at the EU level via the CCD. EU-wide rules on mortgage credit agreements were only intro-
duced in 2014, when the MCD was adopted.  
18 Art 3(1) and (2) of the UCTD stipulate that the UCTD focuses on terms that have not been 
individually negotiated. Additionally, Art 3(1) and (2) and Art 1(2) of the UCTD specify that 
all terms that have been individually negotiated, as well as terms refl ecting mandatory and 
statutory provisions, alongside provisions of international law, fall outside its scope. 
19 Art 3(1) UCTD.
20 Art 6(1) UCTD. 
21 Art 5 UCTD.
22 Art 4(2) UCTD.
23 Yeşim M Atamer, ‘Why Judicial Control of Price Terms in Consumer Contracts Might Not 
Always Be the Right Answer: Insights from Behavioural Law and Economics’ (2017) 80(4) 
Modern Law Review 624, 627−629; Michael Schillig, ‘Directive 93/13 and the “Price Term 
Exemption”: A Comparative Analysis in the Light of the “Market for Lemons” Rationale’ 
(2011) 60(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 933, 937−940.
24 Hans-W Micklitz, ‘Reforming European Unfair Terms Legislation in Consumer Contracts’ 
(2010) 6(4) European Review of Contract Law 347, 365−367.
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based on the UCTD. It should be noted here that this paper focuses on an 
analysis of the transparency of consumer credit agreements. However, 
considering that the CJEU has interpreted the UCTD’s transparency re-
quirements in the same manner with regards to mortgages and consum-
er credit, several cases relevant for the depiction of transparency under 
the UCTD are referred to, including mortgage cases.2526 
As of 2008, the provision of information on consumer credit has 
been extensively regulated at the EU level via the CCD. Although this 
is the second directive regulating consumer credit at the EU level,27 the 
CCD for the fi rst time fully harmonised the information regime applica-
ble to consumer credit contracts and established the said regime as its 
main tool of consumer protection.28 The amount and content of informa-
tion that needs to be disclosed by credit providers varies depending on 
the stage of the (pre-) contractual process.29 In this regard, three stag-
es, namely the stage of advertising, the pre-contractual stage, and the 
contractual stage, can be distinguished.30 For each stage, the European 
legislator prescribed a separate, minimum list of mandatory information 
that has to be disclosed to consumers. For example, credit providers are 
generally31 required to provide consumers with 19 pieces of information 
25 For example, while Case C-26/13 Kásler ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 concerned a mortgage 
credit agreement (para 20), Case C-348/14 Bucura ECLI:EU:C:2015:447 concerned con-
sumer credit (para 19) and Case C-186/16 Andriciuc ECLI:EU:C:2017:703 both mortgage 
and credit agreements (para 8), the CJEU provided the same guidance on the meaning of 
the UCTD’s transparency requirements in all cases (Kásler, para 75; Bucura, para 54; An-
driciuc, para 45).  
26 The Spanish mortgage cases are excluded from this analysis due to the fact that they 
deal with the question of how a breach of transparency is sanctioned, whereas this article 
focuses on an analysis of what (a breach of) transparency entails. For an account of certain 
procedural aspects of the enforcement of the UCTD, see for instance Frederico Della Negra, 
‘The Uncertain Development of the Case Law on Consumer Protection in Mortgage Enforce-
ment Proceedings: Sá nchez Morcillo and Kuš ionová ’ (2015) 52(4) CML Rev, or Anna van 
Duin, ‘Metamorphosis? The Role of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
Cases Concerning National Remedies and Procedures Under Directive 93/13/EEC’ (2017) 
6(5) Journal of European Consumer and Market Law. 
27 The fi rst directive regulating the said area was Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 Decem-
ber 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning consumer credit [1987] OJ L42/48 (1987 CCD). It was a minimum 
harmonisation directive representing the EU’s fi rst attempt in ensuring greater transparency of 
contract terms in the area of consumer credit, by providing some information on its costs and 
conditions (Iris Benöhr, EU Consumer Law and Human Rights (OUP 2013) 113−114).
28 Benöhr (n 27) 116−119; Stefan Grundmann and Christian Hofmann, ‘EC Financial Ser-
vices and Contract Law: Developments 2007−2010’ (2010) 6(4) European Review of Con-
tract Law 467, 478−479.
29 Benöhr (n 27) 117.
30 ibid.
31 The CCD envisages a ‘lighter’ information regime for overdrafts and other specifi c credit 
agreements. The information list for such agreements is provided in Article 6(1) CCD and 
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by means of a standardised information notice prior to the conclusion of 
the contract.32 Once the credit agreement has been concluded, it needs to 
contain at least 22 pieces of information.33 It should be pointed out that 
none of these information lists are exhaustive. This is because credit 
providers are either allowed to provide consumers with additional infor-
mation under the CCD34 or are obliged to do so under other legislation.35 
The European legislator does not, however, merely regulate the 
amount and content of information requirements for consumer credit 
agreements in the CCD. Information requirements are also accompanied 
by transparency requirements. For instance, information on advertising 
on consumer credit has to be provided in a ‘clear, concise and prominent 
way by means of representative example’.36 Or, mandatory pre-contrac-
tual information on consumer credit agreements in principle has to be 
provided in an information notice, standardised at the EU level.37 In-
formation included in consumer credit agreements has to be ‘clear and 
concise’.38 Thus, looking at various provisions of the CCD containing in-
formation and transparency requirements, the following modalities of 
transparency can be observed:  clarity, conciseness, prominence, and 
information standardisation. 
It can be observed that the UCTD and the CCD impose different 
transparency requirements for consumer credit information. If these re-
quirements are also interpreted in a different manner, the transparency 
of the same information provided in the course of the conclusion of the 
same consumer credit agreement could be evaluated differently. Thus, 
in order to establish to what extent this is the case and what the conse-
quences of such interpretation are, I will now turn to an analysis of the 
still contains 14 pieces of information. Another situation in which the provision of informa-
tion that occurs before the contract’s conclusion is reduced (but in this case signifi cantly) 
is where a credit agreement is concluded by means of distance communication, at the 
consumer’s request, and the medium of distance communication does not allow for full 
disclosure. With the exception of contracts concluded by voice telephony communication, 
in cases of contracts concluded by means of distance communication, Articles 5(3) and 6(7) 
CCD envisage that the credit provider has to provide information immediately after the con-
tract has been concluded. In the case of voice telephony communication, Article 5(2) CCD 
prescribes a minimum of fi ve pieces of information that have to be disclosed in general, 
and Article 6(4) CCD prescribes a minimum of four pieces of information that have to be 
disclosed in the case of overdrafts and other special credit agreements.
32 Art 5(1) CCD.
33 Art 10(2) CCD.
34 Article 5(1) CCD.
35 Recital 18 and Article 4(4) CCD.
36 Recitals 18 and 19 and Article 4(2) CCD.
37 Recital 30, Article 5(1) and Annex II CCD.
38 Recital 31 and Article 10(2) CCD.
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meaning and scope attributed to transparency requirements under each 
directive.
2.1 Transparency under the UCTD − plainness and intelligibility 
Although the UCTD has been in force since 1993, its interpretation 
became the subject of an increased number of preliminary references 
only as of 2008.39 As Micklitz and Reich point out, the increased UCTD-
based litigation concerned sectors which are particularly burdensome for 
consumers, like energy, telecommunications and fi nance.40 Even though 
it is not certain what triggered such an increase in the number of pre-
liminary references, considering their timing and content they could at 
least to some extent be the refl ection of the economic crisis in Europe.41 
Among these references, questions regarding the interpretation of 
the trader’s obligation to provide transparent contract terms occupy a 
prominent place. The case law on the meaning and scope of the UCTD’s 
transparency requirements has been actively developing as of 2012, 
starting with cases concerning the transparent provision of information 
on contract terms that allow unilateral adjustments of costs by traders 
in long-term contracts. The fi rst cases of this kind concerned telecom-
munication and energy contracts42 and showed that traders are obliged 
to inform consumers of the existence, the reasons for and the method of 
calculation of unilateral adjustments of contractual costs.43 In order to 
effectively inform consumers on these matters, traders have the duty to 
formulate contract terms in a manner that will allow consumers to fore-
see, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, changes which will stem 
from them.44 In my view, these cases clearly explicated the purpose of 
the UCTD’s transparency requirements − ensuring that consumers are 
able to foresee the outcome of the contract. 
The CJEU’s case law shows that this reasoning, although originally 
developed in other sectors, also applies to credit agreements.45 In this 
39 Hans-W Micklitz and Norbert Reich (n 13) 771.
40 ibid, 771−772. 
41 ibid.
42 Case C-472/10 Invitel ECLI:EU:C:2012:242 concerned telecommunication whilst Case 
C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb ECLI:EU:C:2013:180 concerned energy. Given that the topic of this 
paper is limited to credit contracts, these cases are not discussed here. For a critical ac-
count of the role of transparency in the aforementioned cases, see Candida Leone, ‘Trans-
parency Revisited: On the Role of Information in the Recent Case-law of the CJEU’ (2014) 
11(1) European Review of Contract Law. 
43 Invitel (n 42) para 24−31; RWE Vertrieb (n 42) para 49−54.
44 Invitel (n 42) para 28; RWE Vertrieb (n 42) para 49.
45 Kásler (n 25) para 73; Case C-143/13 Matei ECLI:EU:C:2015:127, para 74; Bucura (n 
25) para 54.
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regard, the Matei case can be used as an example. This case concerned 
terms of a mortgage and a consumer credit agreement that allowed for 
unilateral adjustment of the interest rate by the bank.46 In line with 
previous case law, the CJEU made it clear that, for the purpose of com-
pliance with the UCTD’s transparency requirements, the national court 
must determine whether the credit agreements transparently set out the 
reasons for and the mechanism of alteration of the interest rate, thereby 
enabling the consumer to foresee the consequences of the contracts.47 
In the next stage of development of the case law on transparency, 
the CJEU provided more guidance as to what it actually means to pro-
vide information in a manner that is understandable to consumers. This 
was done in 2014 in the Kásler case, where the CJEU for the fi rst time 
explicitly interpreted the requirements of plainness and intelligibility.48 
The case in question dealt with a mortgage agreement denominated in 
a foreign currency (Swiss Franc) but payable in the domestic currency 
(Hungarian Forint).49 The disputed contract term enabled the bank to 
unilaterally determine the amount of monthly instalments that had to 
be paid in Hungarian Forints on the basis of its selling rate for Swiss 
Francs.50 Since the term in question seemed to constitute a core contract 
term,51 before being able to assess its fairness, the national court had to 
evaluate whether it was drafted in plain, intelligible language. To do so, 
the national court found it necessary to fi rst ask the CJEU whether the 
meaning of the UCTD’s transparency requirements stretches beyond the 
obligation to provide consumers with formally and grammatically intel-
ligible contract terms.52 
The CJEU explained that the requirement of transparency had to be 
interpreted in a broad sense − demanding that contract terms be formu-
lated in a manner that makes them both formally and grammatically in-
telligible and reveals their economic consequences.53 The CJEU opted for 
a broad interpretation of transparency for two reasons. First, the court 
in question took the view that consumers decide whether to enter into 
a contract on the basis of information they have been provided with on 
its terms.54 Second, it emphasised that the UCTD’s system of protection 
46 Matei (n 45) paras 24−26.
47 Matei (n 45) para 74.
48 Kásler (n 25) paras 69−74.
49 ibid, paras 20−22.
50 ibid, para 24.
51 ibid, para 86.
52 ibid, para 33.
53 ibid, paras 71−75.
54 ibid, para 70.
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is based on the idea that consumers are in a weaker position vis-à-vis 
traders, in particular with regards to their knowledge.55 
Applied to the contested contract term in Kásler, which allowed the 
bank to calculate the amount of monthly instalments payable by the 
consumer on the basis of its selling exchange rate of foreign currency, 
this meant that the contract had to transparently provide the reason for 
and the particularities of the mechanism of conversion.56 It also had to 
specify the relationship between that mechanism and other conditions of 
the loan so that the consumer could foresee the economic consequences 
which derived for her from the contract on the basis of clear, intelligible 
criteria.57 
In the same case, the CJEU also explained how the formal and 
economic intelligibility of contract terms have to be assessed. Namely, 
national courts are expected to assess the transparency of a credit con-
tract term in light of all the promotional material and information given 
to the consumer during the contract’s negotiation58 and in light of its 
relationship with other terms and the overall contractual framework.59 
Taking into account the context in which the contract terms are provid-
ed, it must then be established whether their economic impact would be 
understandable to a hypothetical, average ‘reasonably well-informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect’ consumer.60
These criteria were later repeated in multiple cases dealing with the 
question of transparency of terms of credit agreements, such as Matei, 
Bucura, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Andriciuc.61 In my opinion, these cases 
outlined the meaning of the UCTD’s transparency requirements − the 
duty to provide consumers with contract terms that are understandable 
to them both in terms of their grammatical meaning and their econom-
ic consequences. Additionally, the cases in question established how it 
should be evaluated whether both of these aspects of transparency are 
fulfi lled.  
Another development in the CJEU’s case law on the transparency 
of terms of credit agreements occurred recently, in the Andriciuc case, 
which was decided in 2017. In the said case, the CJEU was asked to clar-
55 ibid, paras 70−72.
56 ibid, para 73.
57 ibid, para 73.
58 Kásler (n 25) para 74; Matei (n 45) para 75; Andriciuc (n 25) para 46.
59 Kásler (n 25) para 75; Matei (n 45) para 74; Andriciuc (n 25) para 45.
60 Kásler (n 25) para 74; Matei (n 45) para 75; Andriciuc (n 25) para 47.
61 Matei (n 45) paras 73−75; Bucura (n 25) paras 54−56; Case C-154/15 Gutiérrez Naranjo 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:980, paras 48−49; Andriciuc (n 25) para 44−47.
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ify if the requirement of transparency of a contractual term was limited 
to providing intelligible information on the reasons behind the term’s 
incorporation in the agreement and its operation within the agreement.62 
Or, whether the requirement of transparency must be understood as 
obliging the credit provider to explain to the consumer all possible con-
sequences of the term which may have an impact on the total cost of the 
loan.63 In my view, in this case, the CJEU further clarifi ed the actual 
scope of the obligation to provide transparent information on the terms 
of consumer credit agreements.
The Andriciuc case concerned both mortgage and consumer credit 
agreements, denominated and payable in Swiss Francs.64 Since consum-
ers who entered into the contested agreements received their income in 
Romanian Leu, the risk of an increase in their monthly credit instal-
ments due to the fl uctuation of the Romanian Leu against the Swiss 
Franc was entirely borne by them.65 Consumers argued that the bank 
failed to transparently inform them of the severity of the exchange risk 
entailed by credit agreements denominated in Swiss Francs.66 This is 
because the bank did not explain to them that, unlike other foreign cur-
rencies, the Swiss Franc fl uctuated greatly against the Romanian Leu.67 
The CJEU held that the national court must evaluate whether the 
credit provider communicated to consumers all the information likely to 
affect the extent of their commitment so they could estimate the total 
cost of the credit.68 This evaluation of transparency of credit information 
seems to entail at least two inquiries. First, the national court has to 
inquire whether the information that was provided enabled the consum-
er to estimate the total cost of the credit.69 However, the national court 
also has to inquire whether the failure to mention information, which 
is essential considering the nature of the goods or services that are the 
subject of the agreement, prevented the consumer from estimating the 
credit’s total cost.70 
The CJEU established that the obligation to provide consumers with 
transparent contract terms means that they must be provided with ‘suf-
62 Andriciuc (n 25) question 2 in para 17.
63 ibid.
64 ibid, paras 8−9.
65 ibid, para 9. 
66 ibid, paras 10−11.
67 ibid.
68 ibid, para 47.
69 ibid.
70 ibid.
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fi cient information to enable them to take prudent and well-informed de-
cisions’.71 Applied to the question of how to inform consumers of the risks 
of entering into credit agreements denominated in a foreign currency, 
the CJEU explained that such a risk has to be clear to consumers ‘both 
at the formal and grammatical level and in terms of its actual effects’.72 
Essentially, the information given to the consumer must make her aware 
of the possibility of fl uctuation of the foreign currency and must enable 
her to assess the potentially signifi cant economic impact this fl uctuation 
could have on her fi nancial obligations.73 
Conclusively, to be considered drafted in plain and intelligible lan-
guage, the terms and conditions of consumer credit agreements have to 
be grammatically intelligible and enable a reasonably well-informed and 
critical consumer to foresee and understand their actual economic ef-
fect. This means that, at least in some situations, it will not be enough to 
inform consumers on why a certain contract term forms part of the con-
sumer credit agreement and how it operates within the said agreement. 
If this information does not enable consumers to genuinely be aware of 
the actual and potential costs of credit, it would likely not satisfy the 
UCTD’s transparency requirements. This can be seen in the example of 
foreign currency loans, where the omission of information on how the 
currency’s market fl uctuation may possibly infl uence the cost of credit 
was considered problematic from the point of view of transparency. The 
latter example shows that the credit provider’s information obligations 
with regards to the total cost of credit are understood broadly. This is 
because information on the costs of credit not only has to clearly outline 
the actual total cost of credit at the time it is taken out by the consumer, 
but it also has to illustrate how the total cost might change due to the 
specifi c characteristics of a particular consumer credit product. As a 
result, in order to evaluate a contract term’s transparency, enforcement 
authorities have to take into account the information provided by the 
creditor during the contract’s negotiation, the information contained in 
the contract itself, and inquire whether any other indispensable informa-
tion was omitted.  
Such a broad interpretation of the obligation to provide transpar-
ent consumer credit contract terms is understandable considering that 
the CJEU places consumers at the centre of the UCTD’s system of pro-
tection and strongly embraces the information paradigm. Transparen-
71 ibid, para 51. The CJEU continued with the same line of reasoning in its most recent 
judgment in Case C-51/17 OTP Bank and OTP Faktoring ECLI:EU:C:2018:750 (para 78) on 
the transparency of information regarding loans denominated in a foreign currency deliv-
ered on 20 September 2018. 
72 ibid.
73 ibid.
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cy is in principle used as a double tool under the UCTD, as it is used 
both to eliminate unfair terms from the market74 and to protect consum-
ers.75 However, in my view, the CJEU’s current case law on transparency 
based on the UCTD places stronger emphasis on consumer protection 
than on market strengthening. The CJEU has been consistently empha-
sising that the UCTD’s system of protection is a system of protection 
of the weaker party, ie the consumer.76 It has also expressed the belief 
on numerous occasions that consumers decide whether to enter into a 
contract on the basis of the information on its terms and conditions that 
they received prior to the contract’s conclusion.77 Taking into account the 
ideas that the consumer’s weaker position is caused by a lack of knowl-
edge and bargaining power which is meant to be improved by means of 
information, it is not surprising that transparency is understood broad-
ly under the UCTD. Yet, it is questionable whether the same broad ap-
proach would be justifi ed from the perspective of market-strengthening. 
If information transparency is assessed on a case-by-case basis, with 
a strong emphasis on consumer protection, this might limit the extent 
to which information on consumer credit can be standardised. Namely, 
if the transparency test is limited to the information actually provided 
by the creditor in the course of the (pre)-contractual process, it would 
be easier to standardise such information. Once the transparency test 
is understood in a broad sense and also embodies checking whether 
important information is omitted, this restricts the possibility to fully 
standardise information on consumer credit.  
2.2 Transparency under the CCD − clarity, conciseness, 
prominence and information standardisation 
In 2012, the European Commission (EC) provided some guidance 
on how the requirements of clarity, conciseness and prominence could 
possibly be interpreted.78 Although this guidance is not binding, it is 
supposed to serve for information purposes and as such is likely to in-
74 Case C-473/00 Cofi dis ECLI:EU:C:2002:705, para 32.
75 Case C-484/04 Caja de Ahorros ECLI:EU:C:2010:309, para 27. 
76 ibid; Kásler (n 25) paras 39−40; Bucura (n 25) para 52; Matei (n 45) para 51; Andriciuc 
(n 25) para 44.
77 RWE Vertrieb (n 42) para 44; Case C-226-12 Constructora Principado ECLI:EU:C:2014:10, 
para 25; Kásler (n 25) para 70; Case C-96/14 Van Hove ECLI:EU:C:2015:262, para 41; 
Bucura (n 25) para 51; Matei (n 45) para 74−75; Gutiérrez Naranjo (n 61) para 50. See also 
Thomas Wilhelmsson and Chris Willett, ‘Unfair Terms and Standard Form Contracts’ in 
Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay, Thomas Wilhelmsson and David Kraft (eds), Handbook of 
Research on International Consumer Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2010) 161.
78 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Guidelines on the application of Directive 
2008/48/EC (Consumer Credit Directive) in relation to costs and the Annual Percentage 
Rate of charge’ SWD (2012) 128 fi nal (Guidelines on the application of the CCD).
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fl uence the manner in which national enforcement authorities interpret 
the CCD’s transparency requirements. The meaning of the requirements 
of clarity, conciseness and prominence is explained in the context of 
advertising consumer credit. In the said context, in order to be clear, in-
formation ‘should not be diffi cult to fi nd, nor should it be hidden among 
other information’.79 To be concise, the information on the credit offer 
should not include ‘lengthy or rambling descriptions’.80 And in order to 
be prominent, the information on the credit offer should be ‘in text which 
is not too small or too diffi cult to read relative to other text in the adver-
tisement’.81 
As previously explained, the CCD generally requires credit providers 
to disclose pre-contractual information regarding credit agreements to 
consumers via the Standardised European Consumer Credit Informa-
tion form (SECCI).82 The guidance provided by the EC seems to suggest 
that the European legislator views the SECCI as an information notice 
embodying the requirements of clarity, conciseness and prominence. 
When highlighting the fact that all mandatory pre-contractual informa-
tion on consumer credit has to be provided via an SECCI, whilst any 
additional information has to be given in a separate document, the EC 
explained that this is to ‘guarantee the prominence, clarity and concise-
ness of the standard information as distinct from any other additional 
information’.83 
Behavioural studies have recognised standardisation as a mode of 
increasing the transparency of information that has to be disclosed to 
consumers.84 Research shows that the manner in which the information 
is presented is capable of affecting consumers’ comprehension.85 Addi-
tionally, many experiments have shown that consumers benefi t from the 
presentation of information in a uniform manner because such presen-
tation allows them to compare offers available on the market more eas-
ily.86 This also seems to be one of the main reasons why the European 
79 Guidelines on the application of the CCD (n 78) 11.
80 ibid.
81 ibid.
82 Article 5(1) CCD.
83 Guidelines on the application of the CCD (n 78) 12.
84 Faure and Luth (n 2) 338; David Horton, ‘Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and 
Standard Form Contracts’ (2009) 80(2) University of Colorado Law Review 431, 473, 
484−485. 
85 Maartje Elshout, Millie Elsen, Jorna Leenheer, Marco Loos and Joasia Luzak, ‘Study on 
Consumers’ Attitudes Towards Terms and Conditions (T&Cs)’ 96−103  <https://ec.europa.eu/
info/sites/info/fi les/terms_and_conditions_fi nal_report_en.pdf> accessed 29 October 2018.
86 Akos Rona-Tas and Alya Guseva, ‘Information and Consumer Credit in Central and East-
ern Europe’ (2013) 41(2) Journal of Comparative Economics 420, 428.
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legislator turned to standardisation, along with the aim of reducing the 
complexity of information in the area of consumer credit.87
Considering that the EC, the institution that tailors proposals for Eu-
ropean policy and legislation, claims to be relying on insights from be-
havioural studies in policy-making, one might think that the design of the 
SECCI has been informed by behavioural research. Still, the CCD’s travaux 
préparatoires suggest that the SECCI is merely a product of political com-
promise between two confl icting groups of Member States − one wanting to 
disclose as much information on credit as possible and the other wanting 
to disclose only essential information. Once an understanding on the con-
tent and amount of mandatory information is reached, this information 
is divided into separate categories on the basis of a common denomina-
tor. Consequently, information on, for instance, the type of credit, total 
amount, duration, etc, has to be provided within the section ‘Description of 
the main features of the credit product’, whilst information on the borrow-
ing rate, the APR, etc, needs to be included in ‘Costs of the credit’. 
In my view, it is entirely unclear how merely ensuring that only 
mandatory pre-contractual information on consumer credit agreements 
is provided by means of an SECCI automatically guarantees the clarity, 
conciseness and/or prominence of the said information. In the form in 
which it is annexed to the CCD, the SECCI is a blank notice that has 
to be fi lled in by the credit provider. It does not in any way guarantee 
that information will be fi lled in by the credit provider in a clear, con-
cise and prominent manner. When fi lling in an SECCI, credit providers 
can still make it diffi cult for consumers to fi nd information. For exam-
ple, in providing a lot of information, they can use lengthy or rambling 
descriptions, or draft information in a font size or in a font style that is 
diffi cult to read. For these reasons, establishing that an SECCI was in 
fact given to the consumer prior to the contract’s conclusion cannot be 
equated with the control of transparency of the information contained in 
the SECCI. In order to be able to conclude that the information contained 
in the SECCI is transparent, national enforcement authorities should 
still be required to check whether the SECCI was actually fi lled in by the 
credit provider in a clear, concise and prominent way.    
The EC did not provide any guidance on what the requirement to 
draft information in a clear and concise manner entails in relation to 
contractual information. However, the CJEU, to some extent, interpreted 
this requirement in the case Home Credit Slovakia. It held that, when 
87 Recitals 19 and 43 CCD. See also Catherine Garcia and Willem H Van Boom, ‘Information 
Disclosure in the EU Consumer Credit Directive: Opportunities and Limitations’ in James 
Devenney and Mel Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe (CUP 2012) 
54−55.
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information is disclosed in more than one document, the documents in 
question have to contain clear and precise cross-referencing in order for 
the information, which should have already been given to the consumer 
prior to the contract’s conclusion, to be included in a clear and concise 
manner.88 It is clear from the CJEU’s reasoning in the said case that 
the purpose of these requirements is to ensure that consumers have the 
opportunity to become genuinely apprised of their rights and obligations 
under the credit agreement.89 
It can be noted that none of the CCD’s transparency requirements 
have thus far been interpreted as requiring information to be drafted in a 
way which ensures its comprehensibility to consumers. It is indeed im-
portant for the purposes of ensuring transparency of credit information 
that the said information can be easily found, that it is not too long, or 
drafted in a font size which is too small. Still, considering that the pur-
pose of the CCD’s information regime is to enable consumers to compare 
credit offers and navigate the consumer credit market, it is even more 
important to ensure that consumers are given intelligible information. 
And although the intelligibility of consumer credit information might be 
increased by means of standardisation, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that the SECCI currently does not in any way guarantee consumers will 
be given understandable information. 
If the interpretation of the meaning and scope of the CCD’s trans-
parency requirements is compared with that of the UCTD’s requirements, 
differences can be observed. While transparency under the UCTD has 
been interpreted in a manner that focuses on the comprehensibility of 
information, transparency under the CCD has been interpreted in a way 
that focuses on the format, position, length, and font size of information. 
As a result, the transparency of the same information provided in the 
course of the conclusion of a consumer credit agreement could be evalu-
ated differently on the basis of these two directives. For instance, when 
assessing whether consumers could understand the economic impact of 
consumer credit on the basis of the UCTD, enforcement authorities are 
asked to examine the information that was given to consumers and con-
sider whether other important information was omitted. Under the CCD, 
it looks as though it might be possible to reduce this examination to a 
check of whether consumers were provided with an SECCI or whether 
they were provided with a contract containing clear cross-referencing. 
What is uncertain is whether the European legislator deliberately intro-
duced a different transparency test under the CCD and what the rela-
tionship between the two tests is. 
88 Case C-42/15 Home Credit Slovakia ECLI:EU:C:2016:842, para 34.
89 ibid.
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When providing guidance on how to interpret key notions under 
the CCD, the EC seems to place greater emphasis on the objective of the 
creation of a functioning internal market in consumer credit than on the 
protection of consumers who enter into consumer credit.90 If this were 
indeed the case, a different approach to transparency would not be sur-
prising. Namely, if the principal role of transparency under the CCD is 
to ensure that credit offers and agreements across the EU are as similar 
and comparable as possible, it makes sense that the focus of the CCD’s 
transparency test is to check whether all mandatory credit information 
is provided and is provided in the right format. 
It is important to note that such a transparency test would not place 
suffi cient emphasis on the question of whether consumers understood 
information on consumer credit. This is problematic from the point of 
view of consumer protection. The CCD did not harmonise other possi-
ble tools of consumer protection such as the duty of responsible lend-
ing or the credit provider’s duty to give personalised advice on credit to 
consumers.91 Thus, considering that the creditor’s obligations to provide 
consumers with information on consumer credit is the principal tool 
of consumer protection under the CCD, it is worrying that transparen-
cy has not yet been interpreted as also ensuring the comprehensibility 
of information. Ensuring that the UCTD’s transparency test is applied 
alongside the CCD’s test could solve the problem. If enforcement authori-
ties always check both whether consumers were provided with an SECCI 
and whether the information contained in the SECCI was in plain and 
intelligible language, this could enhance the assessment of transparency 
of consumer credit information. Yet, at the moment this does not seem to 
be ensured. The transparency test under the UCTD seems to guarantee 
a higher level of consumer protection by demanding that consumers be 
given information that enables them to truly understand the economic 
consequences of a credit contact. Therefore, in cases where consumer 
credit contract terms are contested on the basis of the UCTD, consumer 
interests can be suffi ciently safeguarded. However, in situations where 
litigation is based on the CCD, there is a justifi ed worry that the trans-
parency test could be reduced to a check regarding whether all the infor-
mation prescribed by law was provided in a proper format.  
90 Guidelines on the application of the CCD (n 78) 2−3.
91 Grundmann and Hofmann (n 28) 480−482.
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3. The national dimension − transparency of terms and conditions 
of consumer credit agreements in Croatian law
The UCTD was transposed into Croatian law via the Consumer Pro-
tection Act (CPA) in 2003, a decade before Croatia joined the EU.92 The 
UCTD’s transparency requirements and interpretation rules are regulat-
ed in Articles 52, 53 and 54(1) CPA.93 Article 52 stipulates that it is not 
allowed to evaluate the unfairness of the contract’s subject matter and 
the adequacy of price (core contract terms) if the said terms are plain, 
easily intelligible and noticeable. Article 53 prescribes that if, due to the 
law or the parties’ agreement, the contract is in a written form, its terms 
have to be drafted in a plain and intelligible manner and be easily no-
ticeable. Article 54(1) requires ambiguous or unintelligible terms to be 
interpreted in a manner more favourable to the consumer. 
It can be observed that the CPA’s transparency requirements dif-
fer from those under the UCTD, as the CPA adds a third transparency 
requirement to the European test − noticeability. Additionally, the CPA 
formulates the requirement of intelligibility with regards to core contract 
terms differently, ie it requires core contract terms to be easily intel-
ligible. This is not necessarily problematic as the UCTD is of a mini-
mum harmonisation character and therefore allows Member States to 
provide additional protection to consumers.94 However, whether and how 
these additional transparency requirements could enhance consumer 
protection is not particularly clear since the Croatian legislator failed 
to explain the meaning behind their introduction.95 The purpose of the 
requirement of noticeability could be to ensure that traders cannot hide 
contract terms by, for example, placing them under the wrong heading or 
drafting them in fi ne print. Requiring the terms regulating the contract’s 
subject matter and price to be easily understandable might be aimed 
at guaranteeing that consumers can understand the contract’s core as-
92 Zakon o zaštiti potrošaËa NN 96/2003 (2003 Consumer Protection Act). See also Marko 
BaretiÊ, ‘Zaštita potrošaËa u Republici Hrvatskoj nakon ulaska u Europsku Uniju − jesmo 
li implementacijom europskog prava izgradili sustav zaštite potrošaËa?’ in Thierry Bourgoi-
gnie and Tatjana JovaniÊ (eds), Strengthening Consumer Protection in Serbia/JaËanje zaštite 
potrošaËa u Srbiji (Liber Amicorum Svetislav Taboroši 2013) 67.
93 Zakon o zaštiti potrošaËa NN 41/14, 110/15 (2014 Consumer Protection Act).
94 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Report of the Fitness Check on Directive 2005/29/
EC, Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Directive 98/6/EC, Directive 1999/44/EC, Directive 
2009/22/EC and Directive 2006/114/EC’ SWD (2017) 209 fi nal 8. 
95 Documents pertaining to the adoption of the 2007 Consumer Protection Act (Zakon o 
zaštiti potrošaËa NN 79/2007), which initially formulated the transparency requirements 
in this manner, can be found here <http://edoc.sabor.hr/Views/AktView.aspx?type=HT-
ML&id=7834> (accessed 29 October 2018). Documents pertaining to the adoption of the 
2014 Consumer Protection Act can be found here <http://edoc.sabor.hr/Views/AktView.
aspx?type=HTML&id=25872> (accessed 29 October 2018). 
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pects with ease and without having to ask a professional for additional 
explanations. 
Still, it is questionable whether there is a need for different trans-
parency requirements in order to make sure that contract terms are 
visible and understandable to laypersons. For instance, ensuring the 
visibility of contract terms could fall within the requirement of plain-
ness, and ensuring their comprehensibility to the layperson could fall 
within the requirement of intelligibility. Nonetheless, the Croatian legis-
lator could have made the additions in question not being sure whether 
these aspects of transparency would be covered under EU law. This is 
because there were no guidelines by the European legislator or the CJEU 
on the meaning and scope of the UCTD’s transparency requirements at 
the time of the UCTD’s transposition into Croatian law. 
Although the Croatian legislator did not provide guidance on the 
meaning of plainness, noticeability and intelligibility, Croatian courts 
have interpreted all three of the above-mentioned requirements in rela-
tion to mortgage and consumer credit agreements. The case law in this 
fi eld started rapidly developing as of 2012, when a consumer organisa-
tion, ‘PotrošaË − Hrvatski savez udruga za zaštitu potrošaËa’ (PotrošaË), 
started judicial proceedings against several banks (the Franak case) for 
the infringement of the collective interests of consumers.96 The Franak 
case deals with the questions of transparency and unfairness of two 
types of contract terms, namely, terms indexing credit agreements to the 
Swiss Franc (currency clauses) and terms envisaging a variable interest 
rate (variable clauses).97 Currency clauses allowed banks to tie the value 
of the contractual obligation to a foreign currency. This was a widespread 
practice in Croatia that owed its popularity to the perceived instability of 
the national currency, the Croatian Kuna.98 Since its introduction, the 
Croatian National Bank fi rst pegged the Kuna to the German Mark and, 
after the latter ceased to exist, the Euro.99 Pegging the national currency 
to a stable, foreign one was meant to preserve the obligation’s real value 
and protect both the bank and the consumer.100 For these reasons, it was 
perceived safer and was thus more popular to save and take out loans 
in foreign currencies such as the German Mark, Euro and Swiss Franc. 
However, while maintaining the stability of the Kuna in relation to the 
Euro was and is an offi cial policy of the Croatian National Bank, no such 
protection of the relationship between the Kuna and the Swiss Franc 
96 Judgment P-1401/2012 of the Commercial Court of 4 July 2013, 1.  
97 ibid 9.
98 JosipoviÊ and Ernst (n 16) 78−79.
99 ibid.
100 Judgment Revt-249/14 of the Supreme Court of 9 April 2015, 18−19.
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ever existed. Therefore, it was signifi cantly riskier to enter into credit 
agreements indexed to the Swiss Franc than those indexed to the Euro. 
Variable clauses allowed banks to unilaterally adjust interest rates.101 In 
some cases, the criteria on the basis of which interest rates could change 
would be prescribed in the bank’s general terms and conditions.102 In 
other cases, the said criteria would be established by a decision of the 
bank’s management after the contract had already been concluded.103 
The Franak case concerns both mortgage and consumer credit 
agreements, most of which were burdened by both currency and variable 
clauses. Due to the continuous appreciation of the Swiss Franc, which 
started in 2011, the value of credit instalments for loans denominated in 
Swiss Francs rose steeply. Consequently, many consumers were left un-
able to pay off their loans, which, for those who borrowed money to buy 
property, resulted in the loss of their home. The severity of the situation 
thus prompted the collective action in question. Additionally, the Franak 
case inspired new legislative solutions regarding informing consumers 
on particular aspects of consumer credit agreements, which were incor-
porated into the Consumer Credit Act (CCA). The CCA transposes the 
CCD into Croatian law and was fi rst adopted in 2009.104 It mostly fol-
lows the letter of the CCD when it comes to transparency requirements 
for (pre-) contractual information.105 However, the CCA also goes a step 
further by providing creditors with precise guidelines on how to inform 
consumers of their right to have loans tied to Swiss Francs converted 
into loans tied to the Euro106 or how to inform consumers on variable 
interest rates.107 
In this section, I will analyse how Croatian courts interpreted the 
requirements of plainness, noticeability and intelligibility on the basis of 
the provisions of the CPA regulating unfair contract terms in the Franak 
case. I will rely on the same case to demonstrate how information re-
quirements introduced under specifi c consumer credit legislation, name-
ly the CCA, affected the understanding of transparency under the CPA. 
101 Commercial Court P-1401/2012 (n 96) 147.
102 ibid, 152, 155.
103 ibid, 147.
104 Zakon o potrošaËkom kreditiranju NN 75/2009, 112/12, 143/13, 147/13, 09/15, 
78/15, 102/15, 52/16 (Consumer Credit Act). See also Emilia MišÊeniÊ, ‘Usklaivanje pra-
va zaštite potrošaËa u Republici Hrvatskoj’ (2013) 4(1) Godišnjak Akademije pravnih znano-
sti Hrvatske 145, 165−167. 
105 Arts 4, 5, 6 and 10 of the Consumer Credit Act.
106 Art 19.c and 19.d of the Consumer Credit Act.
107 Art 11.a of the Consumer Credit Act.
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3.1 The Franak case − plainness, noticeability and intelligibility 
Throughout the Franak case, the requirements of plainness, notice-
ability and intelligibility were in principle discussed separately and it 
looks as though all three requirements have to be cumulatively fulfi lled 
in order for a contract term to be considered transparent.108 The require-
ment of plainness was only briefl y discussed in the case at hand and 
was associated with the term’s clarity. Namely, contested clauses were 
considered plain because they were formulated in a manner which made 
it clear what their subject matter was. Currency clauses were considered 
plain because they explicitly and unambiguously tied the value of the 
credit to the Swiss Franc.109 And variable clauses were seen as plain be-
cause they explicitly indicated that interest rates were subject to change 
on the basis of the bank’s decision.110 
When discussing the requirement of noticeability, Croatian courts 
adjudicating in the Franak case took into account where the disputed 
terms were stipulated and in what style. Higher courts found it suffi cient 
for the purposes of noticeability that contested contract terms were stip-
ulated on the fi rst page of all credit agreements and were not drafted in 
small font size.111 Unlike the said courts, the court of fi rst instance, the 
Commercial Court, was of the opinion that banks should highlight com-
plex credit contract terms in a specifi c way and warn consumers about 
the said terms.112
When interpreting the requirement of intelligibility, national courts 
considered the CJEU’s deliberations on transparency provided in the 
Kásler case and inquired if consumers could have been expected to un-
derstand the economic consequences of variable clauses.113 The latter 
were found unintelligible to consumers by all courts adjudicating in the 
Franak case. All courts agreed that, in order to be intelligible, variable 
clauses had to specify objective criteria on the basis of which interest 
rates could change.114 The problem with the disputed clauses was that 
they either provided numerous parameters on the basis of which the said 
108 Judgment Pž-7129/13 of the High Commercial Court of 13 June 2014 50−56; Supreme 
Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 17−24, 33−35.
109 High Commercial Court Pž-7129/13 (n 108) 52; Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 17.
110 Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 33.
111 High Commercial Court Pž-7129/13 (n 108) 52; Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 
23, 33.
112 Commercial Court P-1401/2012 (n 96) 176−177.
113 High Commercial Court Pž-7129/13 (n 108) 57; Judgment U-III-2521/2015 of the Con-
stitutional Court of 13 December 2016 31−34.
114 Commercial Court P-1401/2012 (n 96) 152; High Commercial Court Pž-7129/13 (n 108) 
56−57; Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 33.
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change would occur or they did not provide a single one.115 While some 
terms specifi ed that interest rates could be changed on the basis of sev-
eral criteria, the relationship between them was unclear,116 and others 
only provided that the bank would subsequently decide on the modalities 
of change.117 Therefore, in both scenarios, banks did not provide con-
sumers with contract terms that established clear and objective criteria 
on the basis of which interest rates could change. For this reason, it 
was considered that consumers were not given information that would 
enable them to fully understand the economic consequences of variable 
clauses. Such a view of intelligibility mirrors the CJEU’s interpretation 
of the UCTD’s transparency requirements and thus should be considered 
compatible with EU law. 
Unlike the question of intelligibility of variable clauses, the question 
of intelligibility of currency clauses was approached differently by dif-
ferent national courts. The fi rst-instance court, the Commercial Court, 
found the currency clauses unintelligible to consumers. The Commercial 
Court fi rst observed that entering into credit agreements denominated in 
foreign currencies generally entails signifi cant risk, which becomes even 
greater the longer the contractual period is.118 It then compared the risk 
of entering into credit agreements denominated in a foreign currency, 
which is pegged to the national one, with the risk associated with con-
cluding the same type of agreements indexed to a currency that is freely 
fl oating on the market.119 Here it held that, as long as the Croatian Na-
tional Bank pegged the Kuna to the Euro, credit agreements denominat-
ed in Euro would entail signifi cantly less risk for consumers. Contrarily 
(and consequently), credit agreements denominated in any other (fl oat-
ing) currency, including the Swiss Franc, would entail much greater risk 
for consumers.120 The Commercial Court noted that the banks actively 
advised consumers to take out loans denominated in Swiss Francs and 
benefi ted from lower interest rates instead of warning or even generally 
informing consumers of the risk that the currency’s market fl uctuation 
entails.121 Due to the inadequacy of the information that the banks pro-
vided on these risky clauses,122 the Commercial Court held that consum-
ers could not have genuinely understood the currency clauses. 
115 High Commercial Court Pž-7129/13 (n 108) 56−57.
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Higher courts, namely the High Commercial Court and the Supreme 
Court, understood the issue of the intelligibility of currency clauses in 
an entirely different manner. Essentially, these courts found the curren-
cy clauses to be intelligible to any Croatian citizen due to the fact that 
they are legal and widely used in Croatian society.123 This meant that an 
average consumer, who is considered reasonable, informed and circum-
spect, should also be familiar with these clauses.124 They did not fi nd it 
problematic that the banks did not suffi ciently, let alone transparently, 
inform consumers, either pre-contractually or contractually, of the eco-
nomic consequences of currency clauses.125 Such an interpretation of 
intelligibility was ultimately considered defi cient by the Constitutional 
Court, which rightly observed that the mere fact that currency clauses 
are recognised in society does not mean that an average consumer, lack-
ing fi nancial knowledge, can understand their economic consequences 
without having been properly informed.126 
The Franak case was eventually sent back to the High Commercial 
Court with the task to re-evaluate the transparency (and fairness) of the 
currency clauses.127 The aforementioned court rendered the fi nal decision 
in this case in June 2018 and declared the currency clauses non-trans-
parent.128 The High Commercial Court persisted in its fi nding that the 
currency clauses were suffi ciently clear and noticeable.129 However, the 
said court acknowledged that it found the currency clauses suffi ciently 
intelligible due to a narrow understanding of transparency, which dif-
fered from that adopted under EU law.130 Namely, the High Commercial 
Court explained that it considered the currency clauses intelligible be-
cause it assessed them only from the aspect of formal and grammatical 
intelligibility. It recognised that such a transparency test differs from the 
one required under EU law, which also entails an assessment of whether 
consumers could understand and foresee the economic consequences 
of currency clauses on the basis of the information given by the banks 
prior to the contract’s conclusion. Adopting a broader understanding of 
transparency allowed the High Commercial Court to conclude that the 
contested currency clauses violated the requirement of transparency, 
which opened up the possibility of a control of their fairness. 
123 High Commercial Court Pž-7129/13 (n 108) 51−53; Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 
18−24.
124 High Commercial Court Pž-7129/13 (n 108) 52; Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 18−19.
125 Constitutional Court U-III-2521/2015 (n 113) 32.
126 ibid, 32−33.
127 Decision Revt-575/16 of the Supreme Court from 3 October 2017 16−18.
128 Judgment Pž-6632/17 of the High Commercial Court of 14 June 2018 53−59.
129 ibid, 48−52.
130 ibid 52−53.
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In my opinion, this case shows that national enforcement authori-
ties can adopt a different interpretation of the requirement of transpar-
ency of contract terms in the absence of a clear defi nition at the EU level. 
Half of the Croatian courts involved in the Franak case adopted a view of 
transparency which was much narrower than that developed in the case 
law of the CJEU. This is because the said courts focused only on the for-
mal and grammatical aspect of the transparency requirement, without, 
however, inquiring whether banks provided consumers with information 
on currency clauses that enabled them to realise their economic effect. 
Additionally, as explained in the fi rst part of this article, it stems from 
the CJEU’s case law, including cases on foreign currency loans, that 
intelligibility has to be evaluated keeping in mind the circumstances 
of a particular case. EU law requires national enforcement authorities 
to examine the information that was actually given to consumers, from 
promotional materials and other information provided during the loan’s 
negotiation to the information contained in the contract. This exam-
ination includes checking whether any indispensable information was 
omitted and whether a reasonably informed and critical consumer could 
have understood it. Contrary to this, some Croatian courts assessed the 
transparency of currency clauses in a very abstract manner, focusing 
on the fact that currency clauses were legal and widespread in Croatian 
society, which, in the view of those courts, automatically made them suf-
fi ciently intelligible to any Croatian citizen. 
It should be noted that the Franak case was started in 2012 and 
decided in 2018. Thus, the case in question was adjudicated during the 
time that the CJEU’s case law on the transparency of credit agreements 
was still developing. Furthermore, the CJEU only provided particular 
guidance on how to assess the transparency of currency clauses in 2017, 
in the Andriciuc case. Considering there was less certainty as to the 
meaning and scope of transparency under EU law at the time of the 
proceedings in the Franak case, it is not surprising that some Croatian 
courts understood transparency in a different, narrower manner than 
the CJEU. 
In my view, it is important to keep in mind that the degree of protec-
tion consumers will be afforded in litigation against unfair contract terms 
will sometimes depend on whether the enforcement authorities adopt a 
narrow or broad approach to transparency. The Franak case illustrates 
the actual impact that different interpretations of the requirement of 
transparency of contract terms have on the position of consumers. For 
as long as Croatian courts maintained their narrow understanding of 
transparency and considered the currency clauses suffi ciently transpar-
ent, the potential unfairness of these clauses could not be examined and 
they remained binding on consumers. Once the courts broadened their 
93CYELP 14 [2018] 69-98
interpretation of transparency, such a change resulted in the fi nding 
that the currency clauses were not suffi ciently transparent to an average 
consumer, which opened up the possibility of a review of their fairness. 
In the end, mostly due to their lack of transparency, the currency clauses 
were found unfair and therefore null and void.131 This fi nding will have 
a signifi cant, positive impact on the fi nancial situation of thousands of 
consumers who concluded credit agreements containing currency claus-
es in Swiss Francs and will now be able to seek compensation for the 
damage caused by these clauses. 
3.2 The Franak case and the Consumer Credit Act: the impact 
of the interpretation of transparency requirements across 
different legal acts 
As previously explained, the CCA almost entirely mirrors the CCD 
when it comes to the manner in which credit providers have to give in-
formation on consumer credit to consumers. However, the Croatian leg-
islator has also prescribed in greater detail how credit providers have to 
inform consumers of certain aspects of consumer credit agreements un-
der the CCA. One of the aspects of consumer credit agreements that con-
sumers have to be informed about in a particular manner are variable 
clauses. In the Franak case, the Supreme Court refl ected on the specifi c 
information requirements introduced under the CCA when evaluating 
the intelligibility of variable clauses on the basis of the provisions of the 
CPA regulating unfair contract terms. In my opinion, this is a good ex-
ample of how the interpretation of transparency under one legal act can 
be infl uenced by information and transparency requirements prescribed 
by another legal act. 
When assessing the intelligibility of variable clauses in the Franak 
case, the Supreme Court tested the comprehensibility of information on 
the reasons behind and the modalities of changes of interest rates for 
an average consumer. The court in question found it problematic for the 
purposes of intelligibility that the banks had the right to unilaterally 
change interest rates but failed to establish objective criteria on the ba-
sis of which the said change would occur and ensure that these criteria 
would be understandable to consumers.132 The Supreme Court consid-
ered the information on variable clauses that the banks made available 
to consumers highly technical and thus only understandable to fi nan-
cial experts.133 For these reasons, the said court found the majority of the 
disputed variable clauses unintelligible. 
131 ibid, 62−66.
132 Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 33−34.
133 ibid.
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However, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that one bank 
did in fact provide consumers with understandable information on the 
change of interest rates in their consumer credit agreements. When 
evaluating the intelligibility of those contract terms, the Supreme 
Court compared their content with the CCA’s information requirements 
for variable clauses, which were adopted in the course of the Franak 
case.134 Because the terms in question contained the information de-
manded under the CCA, the Supreme Court concluded that they pro-
vided clear criteria for changes of interest rates, comprehensible to con-
sumers.135 Essentially, the Supreme Court held that the requirement of 
intelligibility stipulated in the CPA’s provisions regulating unfair con-
tract terms was satisfi ed by compliance with the CCA’s information 
requirements for variable interest rates. This example clearly shows 
that even if the CJEU does not make links between information and 
transparency requirements in different EU directives, national courts 
will probably make these links when interpreting the provisions imple-
menting the said directives. Furthermore, such an approach will likely 
be considered necessary to ensure consistency and certainty within the 
national legal order.        
Looking into the provisions of the current CCA, it can be observed 
that credit providers offering variable interest rates are under the obliga-
tion to inform consumers in a clear and unambiguous manner of three 
elements.136 First, they have to defi ne the parameter on the basis of which 
the variable interest rate changes.137 This parameter has to be clear and 
familiar to consumers.138 However, whether a certain parameter is clear 
and familiar to consumers will not be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
Instead, it is presumed that the following parameters − EURIBOR, LI-
BOR, the National Reference Rate, the national treasury bond rate or the 
average savings rate − are clear and familiar to consumers.139 Second, 
creditors are obliged to qualitatively and quantitatively elaborate on how 
the parameter could fl uctuate during the contract’s duration, and how 
such a fl uctuation would affect the level of the variable interest rate.140 
Third, creditors need to determine the periods in which the change of the 
interest rate is considered.141 Besides informing consumers concerning 
134 ibid, 25.
135 ibid.
136 Article 11.a(4) of the Consumer Credit Act. See also JosipoviÊ and Ernst (n 16) 80.
137 Article 11.a(1)(a) of the Consumer Credit Act.
138 ibid.
139 Article 11.a(2) of the Consumer Credit Act.
140 Article 11.a(1)(b) of the Consumer Credit.
141 Article 11.a(1)(c) of the Consumer Credit Act.
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these three elements, creditors also have to warn them of all the risks 
that variable interest rates entail.142 
In the Franak case, the Supreme Court found a term specifying that 
the parameter on the basis of which interest rates would change was the 
Swiss Franc LIBOR and that interest rates would be calculated on the 
basis of a proportionate-decursive method intelligible to consumers.143 
By equating the requirement of intelligibility of contract terms in compli-
ance with the information requirements under specifi c credit legislation, 
the Supreme Court failed to assess whether this kind of contract term 
genuinely enabled an average, informed consumer to understand its eco-
nomic consequences. Both the term in question and the CCA rely on 
terminology that can be considered objective since it is recognised and 
used in fi nance and banking. However, this does not automatically mean 
that this information is or should be familiar to consumers. As Bareti  
rightly points out, it is hard to believe that consumers could understand 
very specifi c fi nancial terminology without possessing or relying on ex-
pert knowledge, even in cases where this terminology is defi ned and ex-
plained in legal acts.144 
Additionally, behavioural research consistently refutes the pre-
sumption of the familiarity of both the general public and an average, 
even reasonably informed and critical individual with fi nancial terminol-
ogy in practice. For instance, the Croatian National Bank’s study on fi -
nancial literacy has shown that only one third of Croatian citizens know 
how to perform complicated fi nancial tasks, such as calculating complex 
interest rates.145 Thus, it is dubious whether it should be expected of con-
sumers to be aware of the meaning and use of a parameter like LIBOR 
and to be able to apply, for example, the proportionate-decursive method 
in order to calculate complex interest rates.
Besides failing to evaluate this contract term in accordance with the 
transparency test applicable within the system of control of unfairness 
of contract terms, the Supreme Court also did not inquire whether the 
term in question was clear and concise, as required by specifi c consumer 
credit legislation. Namely, it failed to establish that the said term was not 
diffi cult to fi nd, not hidden among other information or that it did not 
142 Article 11.a(4) of the Consumer Credit Act.
143 Supreme Court Revt-249/14 (n 100) 24−25.
144 Marko BaretiÊ, ‘Je li europsko ureenje ugovornog prava zaštite potrošaËa optimalni 
regulacijski okvir’ in Jakša BarbiÊ (ed), Zaštita potrošaËa u Republici Hrvatskoj (Modern-
izacija prava, knjiga 29 2016) 93−94.
145 Hrvatska Narodna Banka and HANFA, ‘Mjerenje fi nancijske pismenosti i fi nancijske ukl-
juËenosti u Hrvatskoj’ (2015) 8 <https://www.hanfa.hr/getfi le/43343/Mjerenje%20fi n%20
pismenosti%20i%20fi n%20ukljuËenosti%20u%20RH.pdf> accessed 29 October 2018.
96 Mia JunuzoviÊ: Transparency of (Pre-)Contractual Information in Consumer Credit Agreements...
contain lengthy or rambling descriptions, as recommended by the EC in 
its guidelines on the application of the CCD. 
In my view, this means that the Supreme Court failed to test the 
transparency of at least one type of contract term in line with any of 
the transparency tests so far provided by European institutions in the 
area of consumer credit. The fact that a national court has developed 
its own understanding of the requirement of transparency of consumer 
credit agreements is not surprising. Until now, European institutions 
have not interpreted the requirement of transparency of consumer credit 
information in a consistent manner nor explained the links between the 
transparency requirements contained in different legal acts regulating 
this fi eld. As long as this is the case, it can be expected that national 
enforcement authorities will continue to develop their own approach to 
the assessment of transparency of consumer credit contracts. 
4. Conclusion 
The obligation of businesses to provide consumers with transparent 
pre-contractual and contractual information on the goods and services 
they offer is one of the most important instruments of European con-
sumer law. In this article, I have demonstrated the importance of this 
instrument in the area of consumer credit. As previously explained, it 
is considered that the provision of transparent information on credit of-
fers and agreements benefi ts both European consumers and the Internal 
Market. This is because it is believed that consumers decide whether to 
enter into consumer credit agreements on the basis of information on the 
terms and conditions given by the credit provider. Thus, in order to be 
able to choose the credit most suitable to their needs, consumers must be 
able to understand credit information and compare existing credit offers. 
By ensuring greater transparency and comparability of consumer credit 
offers, the EU also aims to promote cross-border lending and to facilitate 
the further development of an EU-wide market in consumer credit.  
However, while European institutions have shown consistency in 
the reliance on transparency as a tool for improving the quality and 
comprehensibility of consumer credit offers and agreements, they have 
displayed a lack of consistency in the interpretation of the meaning and 
scope of transparency. I have depicted this lack of consistency in inter-
pretation of transparency by describing and comparing transparency 
requirements under the UCTD and the CCD, as the position of consum-
ers concluding credit contracts is determined on the basis of these direc-
tives. Whilst the focus of the UCTD’s transparency test is to ensure the 
comprehensibility of information on consumer credit to consumers, the 
CCD’s test seems to be directed towards ensuring that consumers are 
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provided with certain information on credit and that this information 
is given in a specifi c format. If the two tests are compared, it looks as 
though their primary objectives differ. 
Transparency under the UCTD is viewed as requiring creditors to 
provide consumers with information that is going to enable them to gen-
uinely understand the economic consequences of a credit agreement and 
therefore seems to be geared more towards the protection of consumers. 
And since transparency under the CCD is seen as asking creditors to 
provide a certain amount of information, in the right format and without 
obscuring the said format by, for example, engaging in rambling descrip-
tions, it might be more focused on the strengthening of the EU consumer 
credit market. As explained before, the UCTD’s transparency test entails 
an evaluation of the information provided to consumers in the course of 
the contract’s negotiation, the information included in the contract and, 
at least in some cases, a check on whether other indispensable infor-
mation was omitted. Such a broad assessment of transparency, which 
includes not only examining the information that is in fact provided but 
also inquiring whether important information was omitted, might re-
strict the possibility to fully standardise credit information. 
Nonetheless, out of the two tests, the one under the CCD raises 
more concerns. Namely, not only have none of the CCD’s transparency 
requirements been interpreted as ensuring the comprehensibility of in-
formation to consumers, its information model also does not guarantee 
the standardisation of credit information and the greater transparency 
of credit offers. As previously pointed out, this is due to the fact that 
credit information does not always have to be provided on a standardised 
form and, even when it does, credit providers can still fi ll it in in differ-
ent ways or can provide additional information. In order to solve this 
problem, at least one of the CCD’s transparency requirements should be 
interpreted as requiring that consumers are provided with information 
they can genuinely understand. The problem could also be solved simply 
by always applying the UCTD’s transparency test alongside the CCD’s 
test. Unfortunately, this will not always be the case. The case of Home 
Credit Slovakia showed that even the CJEU will not necessarily apply the 
UCTD’s transparency test ex offi cio if the case is litigated on the basis 
of the CCD. And the Franak case revealed that national courts might 
consider the UCTD’s transparency requirements, as transposed into na-
tional law, fulfi lled by mere compliance with the more specifi c national 
legislation implementing the CCD’s information obligations.       
Besides establishing that there is a lack of consistency as regards 
the interpretation of transparency in the area of consumer credit at the 
level of the EU, I have demonstrated that this lack of consistency can 
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have an impact on the manner in which national enforcement authori-
ties assess transparency. In the example of Croatia, I have shown how 
the lack of precise guidance on the meaning and scope of transparency 
at the European level can lead to national courts developing their own, 
different interpretation of transparency. This is problematic in cases 
where national enforcement authorities adopt a narrower understand-
ing of transparency than the CJEU, since such an understanding of 
transparency can have an adverse effect on the rights of EU consum-
ers. Additionally, even if European institutions do not explain the links 
between various transparency requirements in different EU directives, 
national enforcement authorities will probably make these links when 
interpreting national law transposing EU legislation to ensure consisten-
cy and certainty within the national legal order. Therefore, in areas like 
consumer credit, where information transparency is used as the main 
tool of consumer protection and market integration, greater consistency 
in the interpretation of transparency might be the key to ensuring the 
effectiveness of information obligations. 
